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atarzyna Kremplewska’s book Life as Insinuation: George Santayana’s 
Hermeneutics of Finite Life and Human Self examines Santayana’s con-
ception of selfhood, making insightful comparisons with relevant Euro-
pean thinkers and yielding interpretations of important concepts such as freedom 
and tragedy. This work, like Daniel Moreno’s Santayana the Philosopher: Phi-
losophy as a Form of Life (2009; 2015), presents Santayana’s philosophy as an 
attempt “to prevent humans from turning into lunatics” (Kremplewska 111). But 
Kremplewska’s work is distinct in its emphasis on selfhood, indicating the rich-
ness of Santayana’s philosophy and the originality of Kremplewska’s approach, 
which displays impressive knowledge of both primary and secondary sources. 
Her work should influence international conversations about the meaning and 
importance of Santayana’s philosophy, demonstrating its relevance to the Conti-
nental tradition and to an enlarged set of issues ranging across traditions. 
Kremplewska claims that Santayana’s theory of selfhood is central to his phi-
losophy of life, which she calls contemplative vitalism. Both are understood in 
terms of Santayana’s nonreductive ontology, inoculating them against dualistic 
conceptions and making “the reality of human life irreducible to the relations of 
power” (Kremplewska xiv). Kremplewska’s interpretation stands apart from those 
that present Santayana as dissolving the self, reducing it to the vital organizing 
principle of a material being (psyche), or positing an immutable “kernel.” She 
describes a dynamic self that unites material and spiritual aspects, achieving in-
tegrity in an ongoing interpretive process. The first three chapters present Santa-
yana’s theory of selfhood, including what is at stake in such theorizing (living 
well and sanely), the significance of the self to Santayana’s philosophy (theory of 
selfhood as translating ontology into a way of living), and what counts as the 
good life (freedom through finitude and transcendence). 
What is at stake in understanding the self, is a sane and livable orientation to 
the world. A conception of selfhood reflects an understanding of reality, which 
has a bearing on how well we live. Drawing on Charles Taylor’s work, the book 
begins with a survey of European conceptions of selfhood. For Augustine, intro-
spection was checked by the reality of God, which limited the excesses of subjec-
tivity. Aristotle’s relational self-cultivated excellent action and practical wisdom, 
culminating in contemplation. But Cartesianism, lacking Augustine’s antidote to 
the self and Aristotle’s naturalism, resulted in unrestrained philosophical egotism, 
opened a chasm between self and world, and rendered reason instrumental. While 
many subsequent responses to Cartesianism failed to curb the ego or mend the 
self-world split, Kremplewska sees “[a] breakthrough in thinking about subjec-
tivity [with the appearance of] the idea of stream of consciousness” (Kremplew-
ska 12) as in the thought of William James, Edmund Husserl, and Henri Bergson. 
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Their consideration of tensions between subjectivity and factuality and between 
finitude and freedom greatly influenced Santayana as he challenged egotistic 
illusions and rampant subjectivity that marked modernity. 
Santayana’s conception of selfhood is significant because it translates his on-
tology into terms directly relevant to human living. His ontology rejected Cartesi-
anism and Hegelianism and their logic—a logic entailing a hegemonic self and 
insisting that self be persistent, autonomous, and identical to ego or else dissolved 
altogether. Santayana’s ontology united self and world and tamed the ego without 
sacrificing consciousness as do philosophies of will to power. Kremplewska 
points out that Santayana’s ontological distinctions—the realms of essence, mat-
ter, truth, and spirit—account for an intelligible reality, objective truth, the possi-
bility of human freedom through spirituality, the value of imagination in itself, 
and the potential of essences to counter superstitious idealism. This ontology 
allowed him to synthesize traditional oppositions, acknowledging both spirituality 
and materialism, and to suppress ego while articulating a conception of individual 
selfhood. 
According to Kremplewska, Santayana conceived an aporetic self, which in-
cludes seemingly incompatible elements and eludes any fixed and final descrip-
tion. The aporias of self are articulated in Santayana’s terms of psyche, the vital 
pattern of a material organism that preserves its life, and spirit, impotent con-
sciousness or intuition of essences (qualities and forms in themselves). The first 
aporia arises from the contrast of spirit’s disinterested awareness of essences as 
immediate, actual, and infinite with psyche’s experience of the flow of future into 
past involving memory and anticipation. The second aporia arises from the con-
trast of the “Cartesian illusion of spiritual independence” (Kremplewska 41) with 
the fact of psyche’s material nature. 
These two subjective experiences of conflicting elements set philosophical 
challenges; and explanations of the aporias reveal the nature of selfhood. They are 
ignored by conceptions of a fixed, unitary ego, which aspires to master the world 
but proceeds by imposing illusions: Egotistic conceptions ignore the impossibility 
of controlling an irrational material flux or surveying infinite essences; they ig-
nore otherness, denying the complexity and relational aspect of selfhood. Santa-
yana’s ontology counters ego’s illusions and acknowledges our suspension in 
ignorance between irrational matter and infinite essence. His materialism intro-
duces an impersonal perspective without reducing all reality to matter. Matter is 
the realm of power, spirt of the free but impotent witness; and both are real. Ac-
knowledging human finitude is necessary to restrain ego and maintain sanity. 
Acknowledging ignorance and seeking to interpret the experience of the apor-
ias without ego’s illusions, reveals the hermeneutic self, which is “a triadic tem-
poral structure . . . a psycho-spiritual unity with an irreducible first-person per-
spective” (Kremplewska 46). As a structure it unites material body, living organ-
ism, and consciousness; as temporal it is an ongoing process of translating psy-
che’s material impulses into spirit’s medium of essences and then into symbolic 
knowledge of the material realm. Freedom and integrity arise when the self un-
derstands its own nature, which is characterized by finitude and integration of 
body, psyche, and spirit in intelligent action. 
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Spirit adds a dimension of interpretation and communication, transcending 
material existence. This does not deny the material genesis of the self (which 
includes the body and the psyche), but it can reverse the relation in terms of free-
dom. Awareness of essences—of the forms and patterns of existence—frees hu-
mans to articulate an autobiography that is not dictated solely by biology. This 
freedom has limits: the hermeneutic self remains aporetic, spirit remains impotent 
in the realm of matter, but this does not make transcendence unreal. For Santaya-
na, living is transcendence: we come from a birth no one can remember moving 
to a death no one can experience; these limits of consciousness are the material 
events that living consciousness transcends. Birth, death, and the aporias of self-
hood are inescapable reminders of finitude, which modify expectations, restrain 
ego, and discourage delusion. 
The impotence of spirit may make its transcendence seem an unhelpful source 
of freedom; but Kremplewska contends that since Santayana begins his account 
with a dynamic unity, spirit “acquires a function in the context of this whole” 
(Kremplewska 64). If the self is a dynamic unity, the impotence of spirit is con-
sistent with its “activating role in the process of life” provided that it never be 
regarded as distinct from the process (Kremplewska 65). Spirit’s activating role 
can be observed in the efficacy of thinking, which Kremplewska understands as 
“no less material than spiritual . . . a psycho-spiritual, interpretive way of exercis-
ing psychic power and expressing its nature” (Kremplewska 65, 67).  
The dynamic unity of the self and of the ontological realms more broadly is 
key to contemplative vitalism, Kremplewska’s interpretation of Santayana’s phi-
losophy of life. Just as the hermeneutic self unites spirit and psyche, the good life 
of contemplative vitalism unites spiritual and active life. In contemplative vitalism, 
spirit’s ability to raise life above material relations of power makes possible free-
dom of intelligent action, freedom to become oneself (vital liberty), and the free 
life of the mind. Contemplation belongs to the “to the wider dynamics of an indi-
vidual life” (Kremplewska 69), so that spirituality can bring a new quality to the 
dynamic unity of the self and influence active life. In contemplative vitalism, 
reason escapes the narrow constraints of instrumentality and enriches the immedi-
ate quality of human life. 
The benefits of spirituality are explained further in Kremplewska’s considera-
tion of Santayana’s metaphor of masks. Masks cover and uncover nature: they 
cover existences and, like essences, are a medium of understanding and intelligent 
interactions; they uncover nature by revealing our knowledge to be symbolic and 
relative to our concrete lives. Masks are the meaningful results of the hermeneutic 
process and a medium of self-understanding and social relations. Some are tempt-
ed to cling pathologically to a particular mask as a fixed fact; for example, when a 
dogma, ideology, or conventional role stifles spontaneity and personal growth. 
But we live more fully when we regard masks from a spiritual perspective as 
varying expressions of psyche that are immaterial and infinite. This allows us to 
regard them as possibilities for a self and the self as something to be negotiated. 
This provides “the margin of the freedom of authorship” of the self (Kremplew-
ska 82).  
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If a mask, as an expression of psyche, determines a role for a self to play, it 
remains for that self to play the role well or badly: The drama I enact is only part-
ly dependent on the role I am given; there also is the immediate situation includ-
ing other actors in the drama, the audience, the setting, the broader social circum-
stances. In my performance, I can enact my freedom. Kremplewska writes, 
“[e]lements of spiritual practice support the enactment of” the freedom of author-
ship because they cultivate the ability to suspend masks, to momentarily trans-
cend the facts of our decisions and actions, and to remain open and attentive to 
possibilities (Kremplewska 82). This openness and attention, liberated from mate-
rial concerns, “may become a discipline and an art capable of transmuting the 
whole performance of life” (Kremplewska 83). This spirituality is not a final goal 
but a phase of living. Living authentically is no permanent state or final accom-
plishment; Kremplewska characterizes it as “a quality of expression” and “a frag-
ile equilibrium, which depends on a sustained engagement with life” (Kremplew-
ska 84). This equilibrium indicates an honest self—free from delusion and free to 
be itself. 
Chapters 4 and 5 compare Santayana with Henri Bergson and with Martin 
Heidegger, which enhance understanding of significant concepts in Santayana’s 
conception of selfhood by placing them in broader philosophical contexts. The 
chapters appear to reflect the two aporias of the self. Chapter 4’s concern with 
temporality recalls the first aporia that arises from spirit’s eternal perspective and 
psyche’s experience of sentimental time; Chapter 5’s consideration of the relation 
of self and world, or of spirit and matter, recalls the second aporia that arises from 
spirit’s sense of control and the fact of psyche’s materiality. 
Santayana and Bergson shared a concern for freedom from the mechanical 
repetition of material forces, and both thought that spirit and our experience of 
temporality provide opportunities for freedom. Their similarities converge in 
Bergson’s idea of insinuation. Bergson thought of life as continual insinuation or 
infiltration of one thing by some other thing; and it was through insinuation that 
spirit could win freedom from material necessity. Past events as memory insinu-
ate themselves into perception of the present, allowing the self to transcend and 
make sense of the present. In this way, spirit insinuates itself into the material flux. 
In this hermeneutic insinuation, consciousness draws on the past by using 
memory to perceive the present and by using established bodily affects and reac-
tions to respond to the present: The past is “resurrect[ed] in the costume of the 
present moment” (Kremplewska 102). This “paradoxical new repetition” provides 
a margin of freedom from a mechanical repetition and materiality; the past is a 
source of liberation for the self and is essential to human agency. 
Kremplewska writes that Bergson’s “vision of freedom starts with the very 
fact that we endure, have a history, and accumulate memories like a snowball, to 
re-live them creatively myriads of times when thinking and acting” (Kremplew-
ska 103). She explains that Bergson understood finitude as the irrevocability of 
the past and then articulated how it made human freedom possible; these ideas are 
significantly similar to those of Santayana who thought human freedom depends 
on both spirituality and limited psychic experience of time. 
46        OVERHEARD IN SEVILLE  
In the next chapter, Kremplewska imagines a debate between Santayana and 
Heidegger based on Santayana’s reading of Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit, as docu-
mented in George Santayana’s Marginalia (MARG Book 1). Kremplewska finds 
“strategic affinities among large concepts and ideas” (Kremplewska 122) as when 
Santayana indicated rough analogues of his notions of animal faith, realm of es-
sence, and intuition in Heidegger’s work, and when he understood Heidegger’s 
Dasein as “spirit incarnate.” Both thinkers rejected a Cartesian quest for certainty 
and asked, in Kremplewska’s words, “What do the facts of the centrality of 
awareness and thinking to this particular form of life tell us about its be-
ing/nature?” (Kremplewska 115). 
Comparing Santayana and Heidegger’s ideas aids understanding of the aporet-
ic self and the dangers it faces. Because self-understanding is always in the mak-
ing, it involves a risk of failure and tempts abandonment of the vital interpretative 
task. On Heidegger’s view, Dasein tends to falsely understand itself as a thing in 
the world or a fixed and disembodied self. But self always misses itself in its liv-
ing being; what it perceives always comes too late to fully identify the dynamic 
self. This attunement, in Heidegger’s terminology, is, thought Santayana, similar 
to “spirit incarnate” which involves a never-fully understood material psyche and 
a perceived mask or essence which can never reveal the dynamic psyche. This 
situation can tempt one to retreat from life and assume a fixed identity, thereby 
destroying the equilibrium of the honest self. This, for Santayana, is spiritual 
distraction and, for Heidegger, inauthentic being. Recognition of finitude can 
counter this and makes possible a fulfillment of life and a liberation of spirit from 
the distraction of false understanding and delusion. 
More complex than the preceding two chapters, the sixth compares Santayana 
and Nietzsche, and it also surveys modern interpretations of tragedy and reads 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet as an expression of secularized culture and subjectivized 
tragedy. The chapter relates and extends key ideas of the book by presenting San-
tayana’s understanding of the tragic as integral to his criticism of egotism and his 
notion of an aporetic self. 
The notion of tragedy changed with modern conceptions of the self. The an-
cient concern with fate is replaced by individual responsibility and a subjective 
understanding of tragedy. Nietzsche thought the emphasis on individuality deval-
ued Dionysian heroism and tragic suffering in favor of Apollonian representation: 
the mask of convention and static selfhood obscured the fluidity of existence. 
Nietzsche responded with the idea of eternal return, which Kremplewska reads as 
“a metaphysical experiment in thinking . . . a conscious risk, a wager” (Krem-
plewska 168) played out in choosing a temporal perspective that foregoes what 
Santayana called sentimental time. Nietzsche thought this could liberate will, 
transcending accidental, individual being and modern subjectivity. 
Santayana’s criticism of Nietzsche does not, of course, take issue with reject-
ing modern subjectivity; rather Santayana thought Nietzsche’s rejection remained 
adversely influenced by modern philosophy: The doctrine of the will to power, 
which reduced individuality to a play of forces, resulted in a “barbaric” philoso-
phy, and carried on modern philosophy’s rendering “self incapable of transcend-
ence” (Kremplewska 165). For Santayana, Nietzsche’s philosophy had two main 
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harmful results: rejection of transcendence and embrace of instrumental reason. 
According to Kremplewska, Santayana read Nietzsche as replacing transcendence 
with “the spontaneity of the will and [transgression of] the boundaries of humani-
ty” (Kremplewska 171), leaving no place for spirit, ideals, or disinterestedness, 
which make human freedom possible. For Santayana, Nietzsche’s thought em-
bodied instrumental reason, making thinking a means to survival and making 
truth whatever is useful for this (continuing German Idealism’s attempt to elimi-
nate the precariousness of life). “The polemic of Santayana with Nietzsche, then, 
was first and foremost an argument about the possibility and the necessity of 
spirituality” (Kremplewska 175). 
Spirituality in a material world was central to Santayana’s understanding of 
the tragic. Kremplewska writes, “The tragic aspect of existence may be traced in 
the discontinuities within the self, reflected in its aporetic status and fully re-
vealed in the ontology of realms, where the self finds itself in a Pascalian suspen-
sion in-between ‘two abysses of infinity and nothingness’” (Kremplewska 176). 
Conflicts between the human and the divine, facts and ideals, matter and spirit are 
tragic conflicts. Refection on the tragic brings out the significance of the aporetic 
self and of the recognition of finitude. The hermeneutic self neither denies trage-
dy with a conventional mask nor dissolves the self in a play of forces, but seeks 
sane equilibrium between freedom and necessity. The discussion of Shake-
speare’s Hamlet demonstrates how different conceptions of a unified self influ-
ence the experience and understanding of the tragic, and what this means for 
achieving a sane equilibrium. Shakespeare’s work reflected Santayana’s concern 
with how conceptions of the self influenced actual living. 
The final chapter considers the political implications of Santayana’s concep-
tion of selfhood and is a prospectus for further research into the social signifi-
cance of Santayana’s ideas. The chapter, the shortest in the book, is comparable to 
other, longer chapters in the variety of its insights and suggestions, but space 
limits their development. Questions remain (for example, What exactly is the 
negativity of human being? How is it significantly different from the aporetic 
self?), but the book gives the reader faith that succeeding work could address 
issues raised in this final chapter in the detailed manner of the preceding chapters. 
A great value of this work lies in its potential to inspire further reflection on 
how to live wisely. The conception of selfhood articulated here suggests particu-
lar practices and techniques to know oneself and achieve integrity (hinted at in the 
especially compelling sections “Narrative and Dramatic Strategies of Sustaining 
Self-Integrity” and “Dramatic Hermeneutics”). I could imagine further inquiry 
pursued through a re-reading of Santayana’s The Last Puritan as a dramatization 
of selfhood or through development of Santayana’s idea of “auscultation of the 
psyche” (RB 335) and detailed practices of spirituality. 
Kremplewska’s smart and thoughtful book is both demanding and exciting to 
read. The book expresses a strong and inspiring interpretive vision and conveys a 
quiet and convincing confidence backed by admirable scholarship. There is not a 
lack of structure and consistent terminology, but a reader might imagine a more 
explicit guide through the development of ideas; repetitions and digressions might 
more directly illuminate the main themes. The distinctive voice and well-
48        OVERHEARD IN SEVILLE  
grounded understanding evidenced in the work suggest these things may well 
work out as a matter of course in what will surely be further valuable work in 
Santayana scholarship. 
MARTIN COLEMAN 
Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis 
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